The choice between a set of alternatives often depends on how those alternatives are described, as well as their actual economic costs and benefits. We report results from an experiment designed to evaluate the impact of different descriptions of the after-tax wage on both (1) subjects' willingness to perform a work task rather than an alternative leisure option, and (2) the amount of work performed by those subjects selecting the work task. Utilizing an experimental design that facilitates both within and between-subject comparisons, we find that that subjects' willingness to work varies with the framing of the after-tax wage and that, in particular, subjects are much less willing to work when the returns to work are framed as a low wage plus a bonus than when the returns are described as a high wage minus a tax. Along the intensive margin we find suggestive evidence that subjects stop working just before their wage becomes subject to a significantly higher marginal tax rate, but we do not observe similar clustering when gross wages become subject to an equivalent wage decrease that is not described as a tax increase.
Introduction
A standard assumption in public economics research is that agents fully optimize with respect to the actual economic tradeoffs that they face, perfectly calculating the after-tax prices of the consumption, investment, and work alternatives available to them and maximizing their utility given those prices (Chetty 2009) . A corollary of this assumption is that the formal description of these prices does not affect agents' choices. At the same time, it is well-known that preferences may be context-dependent and affected by the way that choices are described or "framed." For example, a number of recent studies suggest that individuals fail to fully incorporate the effects of taxes into their evaluation of market alternatives when those effects are made less salient by the framing of the decision. 1 If behavioral responses to prices are dependent on framing, including whether the effects of taxes are more or less salient, then this has profound consequences for tax policy because it implies that the distortionary effects of taxes on individual behavior and the attendant negative welfare consequences are not just a function of the taxes themselves, but also of how they are implemented and described. To this end, research on tax framing and salience may guide the way toward increasing the efficiency of taxation.
However, while there are a growing number of empirical studies of the effects of tax framing on individual behavior, these are mainly restricted to evaluations of the effects on consumer purchasing decisions , Finklestein (2009) , Gallagher and Muehlegger (2008) , Ott and Andrus (2000)) and, due to data limitations, the effect of framing on labor supply decisions has been largely unexplored. 2 In this paper, we report evidence from an experiment designed to test whether variation in the framing of the after-tax wage affects (1) subjects' willingness to select a "work" task rather than an alternative "leisure" option, and (2) the amount of work subjects are willing to perform, conditional on having chosen to work in the first instance (the "extensive" and "intensive" margins of labor supply, respectively).
We identify the effect of framing on labor supply decisions by presenting subjects with a series of economically identical work/leisure decisions. While the wage schedule faced by subjects was identical across the decisions, the presentation of that schedule differed. Utilizing a within-subject design that generated a rich data-set of individual choices and permits both within and between subject analysis, we find that subjects' willingness to work varies with the framing of the after-tax wage and that, in particular, subjects are much less willing to work when the returns to work are framed as a low wage plus a bonus than when the returns are described as a high wage minus a tax. Along the intensive margin we find suggestive evidence that subjects stop working just before their wage becomes subject to a significantly higher marginal tax rate, but we do 1 For a review of this literature and a discussion of its implications for tax policy, see Gamage and Shanske (2010) . 2 A notable exception is Blumkin et al. (2008) , which finds that a wage tax has a greater impact on work effort than an economically equivalent consumption tax. Other studies have examined the related question of the effect of tax-schedule complexity on labor/leisure choices (Chetty and Saez (2009) not observe similar clustering when gross wages become subject to an equivalent decrease that is not described as attributable to taxes.
Finally, we find a statistically significant correlation between the subjects making different labor/leisure choices across the economically identical tax-framing conditions and the subjects making framing errors in answering canonical survey questions on framing effects drawn from Kahneman and Tversky (1986), which is consistent with heterogeneity in subjects' susceptibility to framing biases. In addition to building toward a deeper understanding of how tax framing affects labor/leisure decisions, our results thus also contribute to the broader literature on framing and other cognitive biases.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental procedures and design. Section 3 details and analyzes our extensive-margin results. Section 4 details and analyzes our intensive-margin results. Section 5 concludes.
2
Material and Methods
Experimental Design
The experiment was designed to test the effect of changing the description of the return to work on (1) the binary decision to choose work rather than a leisure activity, and (2) the amount of work subjects performed, conditional on having chosen to work. We attempt to identify this effect by utilizing a within and between-subject design, in which each subject is presented with a series of four, economically equivalent, work/leisure decisions that vary only in the description of the return to work. The order of the conditions was randomized by subject.
At the beginning of each round, subjects were presented with the choice to "work" for the next nine minutes or spend that time watching any of a pre-selected set of popular YouTube videos (the "leisure" task).
3 Subjects who chose the leisure task received $10 in that round. Subjects who chose to work were presented with a sequence of screens, each of which listed fifteen words in randomized order, and instructed to alphabetize those words by placing a number beside each, corresponding to its alphabetical ordering. Subjects choosing the work task could complete a maximum of ten screens, potentially alphabetizing as many as 150 words. The wage schedule faced by subjects in each condition was identical. Subjects received a wage of $0.60 for each of the first twenty words they correctly alphabetized and $0.09 for each correctly alphabetized word thereafter. Subjects who chose the work task were guaranteed a minimum payment of $5.00 for that round, even if they did not alphabetize any words correctly.
The four conditions consisted of flat tax, progressive tax, bonus, and no tax conditions. Each condition presented subjects with the same economic decision, and differed only in how the wage schedule was described. In the flat tax condition, the wage schedule was described as being composed of a declining gross wage and a flat tax of 40%. The schedule in the progressive tax condition was described as a fixed gross wage and an increasing marginal tax rate. The bonus condition described the schedule as a declining gross wage and a declining bonus payment for each word correctly 3 A list of those pre-selected videos is available in Appendix B.
alphabetized. The wage schedule in the no tax condition was described solely in terms of the payment that the subject would actually receive for each word alphabetized. Table 1 summarizes the wage schedule descriptions presented to subjects in the four conditions and the screen shots of the language are provided in Appendix C. Although the after-tax wage schedule was identical in all conditions, the gross wage schedule is uniformly higher (or at least as high) in the progressive tax condition as compared to the flat tax condition, in the flat tax as compared to the no tax condition, and in the no tax as compared to the bonus condition. The conditions were chosen to correspond to familiar forms of taxation; the U.S. federal tax system contains elements of each. Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes are withheld from employees at a flat rate of 7.65% 4 up to a threshold wage level above which only the Medicare tax is imposed; the U.S. federal income tax statutory rates are progressive, increasing with income; and the bonus condition resembles the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which is designed to increase earnings among lowincome families by providing a wage subsidy in the form of refundable tax credits. 5 The experimental design allows us to test two hypotheses, generated by different assumptions about the preferences of our subjects. Hypothesis 1: if subjects' work/leisure preferences do not depend on the formal description of the compensation for work, the proportion of subjects working in each condition will be the same.
Hypothesis 2:
if subjects' work/leisure preferences depend on the gross wage schedule, the largest proportion of subjects will work in the progressive tax condition, followed by the flat tax, no tax, and bonus conditions. In addition to being able to test these two hypotheses, we are able to describe the heterogeneity in decision patterns of individual subjects.
Procedures
Subjects were recruited from a subject pool maintained by the UC Berkeley Experimental and Social Science Laboratory (the "X-Lab"). The X-Lab handles subject payout and recruitment for UC Berkeley researchers in addition to providing individual computer workstations that isolate subjects from one another. The experiment was conducted in six sessions over two days in May, 2009 and October, 2009 using the ZTree program for ready-made economics experiments (Fischbacher 2007). We collected data from 74 subjects on the first day and 76 subjects on the second day. 6 Nearly all of the subjects in the X-Lab's recruitment pool are undergraduate students at UC Berkeley, which is reflected in our sample; more than 90% of our subjects were undergraduates. 59.73% of the subjects were female.
The procedures used in all sessions were identical. In each session, 25 subjects (on average) were brought into the laboratory and randomly appointed seats. Subjects were separated by partitions and no communications were permitted between them during the entirety of the experiment. Each subject was seated in front of a laptop computer running the Z-Tree program and was provided with headphones so he or she could watch YouTube videos and perform the work tasks without disturbing the other subjects or being observed by them.
Before beginning the experiment, the experimenter read the instructions (a copy of which was provided to each subject) and subjects were given the opportunity to ask clarifying questions. Subjects were given one minute to look over the YouTube videos available for the leisure task. Once the experiment began, each subject proceeded through the four conditions, the order of which was randomized by subject, before answering a series of demographic questions and survey questions from the canonical framing literature designed to collect additional information about subjects' susceptibility to framing effects. At the end of the experiment, one condition was randomly chosen to be paid out and subjects were paid by check.
Appendix A contains all condition-specific and survey language shown to the subjects, as well as further explanation of the rationale behind the non-demographic survey questions. Appendix B contains the list of YouTube videos provided to the subjects. Appendix C contains the actual screens shown to subjects during the course of the experiment. Each subject participated in the experiment only once.
Results

Extensive Margin Results
We consider first how the wage schedule frames affect the binary decision to work rather than engage in a leisure activity, on the aggregate and individual levels. In Section 3.1, we examine the frequency with which subjects chose to work in each condition. In Section 3.2, we examine the subject-level data in greater depth and use the results of our survey questions to explore how subjects' abilities to properly calculate probabilities and expected values, recognize economic and probabilistic equivalence, and maintain consistent risk positions correlate with their behavior in the experiment.
Work-Leisure Decision Making and Ordering Effects
Since all four conditions presented subjects with economically identical work/leisure decisions, and the order of conditions was randomized by subject, we are able to test the null hypothesis of equality in the proportion of subjects working in all four conditions and attribute variation to the wage-schedule description. A simple comparison of these proportions suggests that the description of the wage schedule affected workrates. 87% of our subjects chose the work task in the flat tax condition, 83% chose to work in the no tax condition, 80% chose to work in the progressive tax condition, and only 55% of our sample chose to work in the bonus condition. Table 2 shows the results from two-tailed equality of proportions tests between the four conditions, illustrating that subjects were less likely to work in the bonus condition than any of the other conditions. The difference in the proportion of subjects working in the bonus condition is statistically significantly different from the other conditions at the < 1% level and is also of a significant magnitude. 25% fewer subjects worked in the bonus condition than in the progressive tax condition and 32% fewer subjects worked in the bonus condition than in the flat tax condition. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that subjects were equally likely to work in the other conditions at conventional levels of significance, using two-tailed tests. We reject Hypothesis 1 -that the proportion of subjects working in all four conditions is the same and subjects' work/leisure choices are independent of the description of the wage schedule. The description of the wage schedule in the bonus condition made work much less attractive to subjects than the descriptions in the other wage conditions. Hypothesis 2 was that successively fewer subjects would work in the progressive tax, flat tax, no tax, and bonus conditions. In fact, although the work rates decreased from the flat tax, to the no tax, to the bonus conditions, the work rate in the progressive tax condition was lower than all but the bonus condition. Furthermore, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal work rates between the first three conditions. Our strategy for identifying the effect of framing on subjects' willingness to work relies on the assumption that there are no differences between the conditions other than the description of the wage schedules. One variable that might affect the willingness of a subject to work in a given condition is the order in which that subject encountered the condition. For example, subjects might be more willing to work earlier in a session if they find the work tiring, or they may be less willing to work earlier in a session if they are more curious about the YouTube videos than the work task. For this reason, we randomized the order of the conditions by subject, so that each condition was as likely to appear first as second, third, or fourth. Table 3 illustrates the result of this randomization process. We find evidence that the round in which a condition was encountered affected subjects' willingness to work. Subjects were less willing to work in later rounds than in earlier rounds. 137 subjects worked in the first round, 115 worked in the second round, 98 in the third round, and 106 in the fourth round. Linear probability and probit models of the effect of the round in which a condition was encountered on the subjects' decisions to work finds that the round has a significant effect. 7 Although the randomization process was largely successful in ensuring that individual conditions were uniformly distributed across rounds, the effect of order on work-rates suggests that the interpretation of variation at the individual level must be carefully interpreted to avoid confounding the effect of a condition with condition order. Table 4 reports the estimates of the effect of the various tax conditions on the probability of choosing the work task, controlling for the fixed effect of the round in which the condition was encountered using dummy variables. Controlling for level effects of the session round on work probability, the effect of the bonus condition persists, and the progressive tax condition becomes statistically significant: framing the wage schedule as composed of a gross wage and either a progressive tax or bonus payments decreases the subjects' willingness to work, relative to the flat tax condition. This effect is significant at the <10% level for the progressive tax condition and <1% level for the bonus condition.
Patterns of Individual Work-Leisure Decisions
We observe that, in the aggregate, subjects were much less willing to work in the bonus condition than in any other condition, and that they were also less willing to work in the progressive tax condition than in the flat tax condition. Because each subject was subjected to all four conditions, we can also analyze the data at the subject-level.
Nearly all of the subjects worked more than once; 35 worked twice, 54 worked three times, and 55 subjects worked in all four conditions. The number of times subjects chose to work is positively correlated with the average number of words they correctly alphabetized. This appears to reflect a learning, rather than selection, effect. Table 5 depicts the average number of words alphabetized by each group of subjects (those working one, two, three, or four times) by the condition in which they worked. Each group uniformly performed better each successive time they tried the work task and there does not appear to be much difference across groups in how they performed, although the subjects working twice performed slightly worse than the other groups. The fact that subjects performed better later in the experiment also suggests that fatigue was not a significant factor in the subjects' decision-making, assuming that fatigue affects both the decision to work as well as the subjects' performance at the work task. Table 6 shows the frequency of each pattern of work/leisure choices in our sample. The table is divided into three groups, illustrating the pattern of work/leisure choices made by subjects who worked in one, two, or three conditions, with the total number of subjects choosing to work that number of conditions listed in the final row. Each cell, located at (row, column), contains the number of subjects who chose to work in the conditions row, and column. For example, of the 35 subjects that chose to work twice, five of them worked in the No Tax and Progressive Tax conditions. Table 6 illustrates that among subjects who chose to work in only two or three conditions, the choice of which conditions they choose to work in is not random. If subjects chose the conditions they worked in randomly, the distribution of pattern choices should be uniform -each condition would have been chosen by approximately 50% of the subjects choosing to work twice, and by approximately 75% of the subjects choosing to work three times. Instead, only 25% of the subjects working twice chose to work in the bonus condition and only 33% of the subjects working three times worked in the bonus condition.
An OLS regression of the number of conditions worked by a subject on a collection of demographic variables and the subject's performance in the first condition worked reveals that none of these variables has a statistically significant correlation. Since neither demographic variables nor the subjects' performance in the first condition in which they worked are significantly correlated with the total number of conditions in which the subjects worked, we consider now the possibility that the subjects' decisions were affected by the variation in the description of the conditions, and that the failure to choose consistently across all four conditions -i.e. to work in either none or all of the Page 11 of 32 conditions -is a result of the failure to appreciate that the economic incentives were identical in each condition.
Under the assumption that the failure to make the same work/leisure choice in each condition is a mistake, we define a new variable ("decision errors") that is equal to 0 if the subject worked either zero or four times, is equal to 1 if the subjects worked once or three times, and is equal to two if the subject worked twice. This definition characterizes a subject that worked once or three times as having made one error (by working once, or failing to work once) rather than three errors.
We emphasize that subjects who did not make the same work/leisure choice in each condition were not necessarily making mistakes. A subject might rationally choose to work in only some of the conditions. However, the non-randomness of the conditions in which the subjects chose the work/leisure tasks implies that a significant number of the subjects selecting non-uniform work/leisure choices were in fact making decision mistakes. It thus seems worth exploring the connection between these possible decision mistakes (measured by our "decision error" variable) and other measures of the subjects' proclivity to make framing errors.
At the end of the experiment, we presented subjects with a series of questions drawn from Tversky and Kahneman (1986) to test whether subjects are able to recognize and reveal consistent preferences over economically equivalent choices that differ in how the alternatives are framed. 8 Subjects who expressed different preferences in survey questions 4 and 5, or in survey questions 6 and 7, each pair offering subjects economically identical choices, were deemed to make a "survey mistake." We are interested in the correlation between the decision-error variable and survey mistakes. Table 7 reports the results from OLS, ordered probit, and ordered logit regressions of the number of work/leisure decision errors made by subjects on demographic variables, the number of words correctly alphabetized by subjects in the first condition they worked, and the number of mistakes made by subjects in the survey questions. We find that across all three models, the number of framing mistakes made by subjects in the survey is positively correlated with the number of work/leisure decision errors. Freshman students were also more likely to make work/leisure decision errors than students in other classes or non-student subjects. The other demographic variables, as well as the number of words subjects correctly alphabetized on their first try, are not statistically significantly correlated with the number of decision errors. We do not draw strong conclusions from these results; however, they are consistent with heterogeneity among subjects in their ability to integrate all of the relevant variables and perform the computations necessary to make consistent choices across alternatives with economically equivalent consequences but different presentations.
The experiment revealed interesting effects of the wage description on labor/leisure decisions. First, subjects are much less willing to work if their compensation is framed as a low gross wage and a set of bonus payments than if it is Page 13 of 32 described as a higher gross wage subject to a tax. There is also some evidence that subjects are less willing to work if that wage tax is framed as subject to a progressive tax, rather than a flat tax. These results persist when the distribution of individual work/leisure decision patterns are examined; regardless of whether subjects worked once, twice, or three times, it was comparatively rare to work in the bonus condition. Second, we observe a significant correlation between the number of "decision errors" and the number of inconsistent choices made by subjects in the survey portion of the experiment across formally identical, but differently framed, alternatives.
Intensive Margin Results
We now explore the effect of our conditions on how much subjects worked conditional on their having chosen to work in the first place -the "intensive margin" of labor supply. Our measure for how much subjects work is the number of words they attempted to alphabetize. 9 Table 8 shows that subjects' work output was, on average, similar across the no tax, flat tax, and bonus conditions; however, they alphabetized significantly fewer words, on average, in the progressive tax condition. One cause of this difference is readily apparent in Figure 1 , below, which illustrates the distributions of work output across the four conditions. The red vertical line appearing in each histogram indicates the 20-word threshold. This is the point at which the piecewise linear wage schedule breaks. In the flat tax and no tax conditions, this break is the result of a fall in the gross wage, and in the bonus condition this break results from a fall in the gross wage and the bonus payment. In the progressive tax condition, this break results from an increase in the marginal rate of tax from 40% to 91%. Whereas there is no clustering around the 20-word mark in any other treatment, seven subjects, or 5.83% of those choosing to work in the progressive tax condition, stopped working after alphabetizing 20-words. None of these subjects stopped working after 20-words in any other treatment, answering on average 100.5, 93.4, and 94.8 words in the flat tax, no tax, and bonus treatments, respectively. The clustering around the wage schedule discontinuity that is unique to the progressive tax condition suggests that the framing effect of a sharp rise in the marginal tax on the return to labor may have a greater 
Conclusions
This experiment adds to the growing empirical literature on the importance of considering the framing of prices when predicting behavioral responses. Whereas data limitations have restricted most research on tax framing to analyzing only consumer purchasing decisions, we focus on how framing affects labor/leisure choices. In particular, our experiment provides evidence that the framing of direct tax instrumentssuch as income taxes, payroll taxes, cash-flow consumption taxes, and wage subsidiesmight affect the impact of these tax instruments on work/leisure decisions. As these instruments are the primary tax mechanisms employed for conducting redistribution and for basing tax assessments on a taxpayer's ability-to-pay, the question of whether framing can mitigate the labor/leisure distortions caused by these tax instruments may have firstorder policy implications.
Our strongest result comes from our bonus condition. Subjects who chose to work in only 1, 2, or 3 of our four tax framing conditions overwhelmingly chose not to work in the bonus condition. Specifically, they only chose to work, on average, approximately 29% of the time in the bonus condition -a striking figure given that they chose to work approximately 81% of the time in the flat tax condition. 10 Further research will be needed to determine the extent to which this result applies outside of laboratory conditions. Certainly the stakes of labor supply decisions made outside of the lab are much higher and it is possible that learning may, over time, cause individuals to become less responsive to these framing effects. To the extent that similar effects persist outside the lab, they may have implications for government programs designed to increase labor-force participation such as the EITC. In this regard, our findings complement Chetty and Saez's (2009) evidence that educating taxpayers about the EITC increases its labor-supply effects. Both studies suggest that wage subsidies that are framed as bonuses may have a smaller effect than equivalent subsidies incorporated into gross wages. To the extent that increasing labor-force participation is a primary goal of the EITC and similar programs, our finding may suggest that this goal could be better achieved through direct wage subsidies such as those proposed by Phelps (1997). The magnitude and degree of statistical significance of our result supports the need for further research into this phenomenon.
More broadly, the result for our bonus condition builds on and supports the general finding from the consumer behavior literature that decomposing an aggregate price into a lower base-price plus a surcharge can lead to consumers underestimating the aggregate price (Kim and Kachersky (2006)). Future research might explore how this effect relates to performance bonuses paid by employers in addition to bonuses paid through the tax system.
Beyond the bonus condition, our progressive tax condition produced suggestive results along both the extensive and intensive margins. With respect to the extensive margin, subjects were on average 6.7% less likely (p=0.096) to work in the progressive tax condition than in the flat tax condition. With respect to the intensive margin, we find some evidence of clustering around the number of questions at which marginal rates within the progressive tax condition rise to 91%, clustering which is entirely absent in the other conditions. Subjects' failure to cluster in our non-progressive tax conditions corresponds with Saez's (2002) finding that taxpayers generally fail to bunch at kink points in their tax-rate schedules. Saez (2002) interpreted his finding as supporting rigidities and uncertainties in labor supply choices. Our result suggests an additional explanation -that the complexity of income-tax rate schedules may reduce the salience of kink points.
Taken as a whole, our experimental results suggest that the impact of taxation on labor/leisure decisions depends partially on the framing of the tax instruments. Further research will be needed to explore the robustness of these results to non-laboratory environments and to variations on our framing conditions. Yet when combined with the larger literature on how the framing of taxes impacts consumer purchasing decisions, our results support the importance of tax framing for both policymakers seeking to design efficient tax systems and for scholars seeking to understand the behavioral effects of existing tax instruments.
Progressive Tax Condition:
a. If you select the work task, your earnings will depend on how many words you correctly alphabetize. You will receive $1.00 for each word you correctly alphabetize. b. If you choose the work task, a tax will be deducted from your earnings at the end of the round. For the first $20.00 you earn, the tax rate will be 40%, so you will only receive 60% of the first $20.00 you earn as payment. For anything you earn above $20.00, the tax rate will be 91%, so you will receive only 9% of anything you earn above $20.00. There are ten alphabetizing screens in this section, with 15 words on each screen. So, the most that you can earn by performing the work task in this round, before the tax is deducted, is $150.00. Tax 
Bonus
